146 |
HIS
FULL SUCCESS IN MEDINA. |
[BK. I. CH.II. |
|
too inviting not to seize it with alacrity. Not merely
'the believers,' but also some of the heathens responded
to the call, thus proving that the motives which gathered
men around the Arab Prophet were not of a purely religious,
but also of a very worldly nature. So eager were even
the heathens to participate in the affair, that several
of them, there and then, professed Islam, rather than
lose so splendid an opportunity of making booty. Mohammed
gathered a larger army on this occasion than had ever
before served under his banner. For though his direct
object was only to overmatch and plunder the caravan,
he could not be sure whether he might not have to encounter
armed troops, sent out for its protection. His army
consisted of more than 300 men, namely all the refugees
from Mecca, 83 in number, 61 Awsites and 170 Khazrajites,
as specified by Ibn Ishak.
Mohammed, always keen-eyed to discover advantages
in his favour, decided to attack Abu Sofyan at Bedr,
where the caravan route approached Medina to about a
couple of days' march, and where a number of wells furnished
a rich supply of fresh water. Thither he despatched
two spies to collect information for him, about the
movements of the caravan. When the Moslems had reached
the neighbourhood of Safra, Mohammed inquired after
the names of the tribes living there, and on being told
that one was called Beni Nar (= 'the sons of fire'),
and another Beni Hurak (= 'the sons of burning'), he,
superstitious as he was, considered the names of evil
omen, and would not remain amongst them, but passed
on to the valley of Zafiran where he encamped. Here
he received the important tidings that the Koreish had
despatched a body of troops from Mecca to protect their
caravan. The latter could therefore no longer be looked
forward to as an easy prey, but the prospect arose before
him of a serious fight, a sanguinary battle. Hence Mohammed,
before advancing further, had to make sure whether,
under these altered circumstances, he could still rely
on the fidelity of all his followers. For it must be
remembered that the men of Medina had as yet only given
him the pledge of protecting him in their own home,
but not outside their territory or in a war of aggression.
He therefore asked them to say whether they were ready
to stand by him in the |
|
SEC. II. 5.] |
ATTACK
OF CARAVAN DECIDED UPON. |
147 |
|
present enterprise. Several high-flown speeches were
made, in which all protested their firm allegiance,
and promised Mohammed that not one would remain behind,
even should he lead them against the enemy the very
next day. He was rejoiced by these assurances of his
troops, and told them, in return, that God had shown
him that the enemies whom they were going to meet should
be few, and that either the caravan or the army should
be delivered into their hands, adding, 'By Allah! I
already see them, in spirit, lying stretched out before
me.' But as the enemies, instead of being few, turned
out to be twice the number of the Moslems, Mohammed,
later on, sought to justify his statement, by letting
himself be thus addressed in a verse of the Koran: 'God
showed them to thee in thy sleep as few; for if He had
shown them to thee as many, you would certainly have
become faint-hearted and would have disputed about the
matter: but from this God kept you, for He knows what
is in the heart' (S. viii. 45).
After having assured himself of the fidelity of his
entire army, Mohammed quitted Zafiran to move nearer
to Bedr. On the way he was met by his two spies, who
told him that they had proceeded as far as the wells
where they overheard the conversation of two damsels.
The one said to the other, 'When the caravan arrives
tomorrow, or the day after, I shall work for it, and
then be able to repay thee my debt.' From this information
Mohammed could conclude that he had full time to prepare
his attack upon the caravan, without any haste. But
wary Abu Sofyan, travelling with all speed, already
arrived that same evening at the wells; and having ascertained
that two riders on camels from Medina had been there,
he at once perceived the necessity of trying to avoid
a possible surprise from Mohammed and his party. Accordingly
he did not encamp there, much as his beasts required
rest, but continued his journey with the least possible
delay. Travelling all night, he succeeded in putting
a safe distance between himself and his would-be plunderers.
He was also aware that troops from Mecca were on their
way for his protection; for, rightly gauging his danger,
he, at the proper time, had urgently demanded such succour
by a special messenger. Therefore the faster he marched,
the sooner he could hope to meet with his protectors.
But, after all, he |
|