166 HIS FULL SUCCESS IN MEDINA. [BK. I. CH.II.

personal valour; but the ditch and dike proved an effectual barrier to their cavalry and largely contributed to their ignominious failure. Another great advantage on the side of the besieged was this, that they had been able to collect all the produce of the field within the city, so that there was plenty of food for man and beast, whilst the enemy found the whole neighbourhood bare and had to send foraging parties to a great distance. The ditch and rampart keeping the two armies apart, there could not be the single combats so usual in Arab warfare. But it was easy for the confederates, from their superiority of numbers, to keep the city in perpetual alarm, by incessant and constantly changing attacks on different parts of the city, compelling the defenders to divide into several corps, so as to be speedily at hand on every point which might be threatened. These sudden attacks were generally made and repulsed by means of shooting arrows and throwing stones. They were rather harassing than sanguinary.

After these resultless alarms had been kept up for some time, a little band of four daring horsemen succeeded in crossing the ditch, at a spot where it was narrow, and thus broke the novel spell of the fortifications, for a moment. But instead of immediately securing the ground they had gained and seeking to facilitate the crossing over of the army after them, they recklessly advanced, and one of them, the aged Amr, who wished to avenge a wound he had received at Bedr, loudly challenged any of the Moslems to single combat. The Moslems were not slow in occupying the weak point of the ditch; and one of them, the heroic Ali, took up the challenge to the duel. After a brief combat, Amr was killed, and lay stretched upon the ground 'like the trunk of a tree.' Then his three companions sought safety in a swift retreat, but only two of them succeeded, and the third, unable to clear the ditch, was cut down there by a pursuer. In the night the dangerous part of the ditch was widened and deepened, under the direction of Salman the Persian, and for some days longer the hostile armies remained face to face, and exchanged showers of arrows across the ditch which kept them asunder. These arrows did little harm, and we can form an idea of the very unbloody character of the

SEC. II. 7.] SIEGE OF MEDINA. 167

blustering Arab wars of those days, and especially of the absence of martial qualities amongst the allied forces of Meccan traders and greedy Bedouins, when we are told that, during this close siege of several weeks, the Moslems had only five men killed, and the entire loss of the confederates amounted to three, inclusive of the two heroes who dared to beard the Moslem lions in their den behind the ditch.

Both sides evinced a greater partiality for cunning and secret machinations, than for self-sacrificing heroism. Mohammed was ready to buy off the powerful Beni Ghatafan and to induce them to desert the Meccans, by the offer of the third part of Medina's date harvest. He had already made progress in his secret negotiations with their chiefs, one of whom, Oyeina, was under obligation to him for a former act of kindness, during a season of drought; but the plan had to be relinquished, because the leading men of Medina were reluctant to part with their dates. Abu Sofyan, on his part, made underhand efforts to induce the Beni Koreiza, the only Jewish tribe still remaining in Medina, to play falsely to Mohammed by raising the banner of revolt in the city itself and openly embracing the cause of the besiegers. But the Jews considered such a step fraught with too great a peril; for Moslem soldiers were constantly patrolling the streets, and the Jews were well enough acquainted with Arab fidelity to apprehend that they might be deserted and left to Moslem vengeance, in case the confederate cause did not triumph. All these intrigues from both sides did not lead to any practical result, and, as spies were freely employed, only served to increase distrust against the suspected parties and to lessen the disposition to risk a decisive engagement.

When the siege had lasted for two or three weeks, Medina was still intact behind its dike and effectually guarded by its untiring defenders; but the hosts of besieging Bedouins were sorely pressed by want of provisions for the men and fodder for their numerous camels. The hardships of the Meccan army were increasing, and no gain accrued to compensate for them. At last a violent tempest, with cold wind and pouring rain, swept over the district, so that the tents were blown down, the cooking-pots upset, and the fires extinguished. According to Ibn Ishak, one of Mohammed's