166 |
HIS
FULL SUCCESS IN MEDINA. |
[BK. I. CH.II. |
|
personal valour; but the ditch and dike proved an
effectual barrier to their cavalry and largely contributed
to their ignominious failure. Another great advantage
on the side of the besieged was this, that they had
been able to collect all the produce of the field within
the city, so that there was plenty of food for man and
beast, whilst the enemy found the whole neighbourhood
bare and had to send foraging parties to a great distance.
The ditch and rampart keeping the two armies apart,
there could not be the single combats so usual in Arab
warfare. But it was easy for the confederates, from
their superiority of numbers, to keep the city in perpetual
alarm, by incessant and constantly changing attacks
on different parts of the city, compelling the defenders
to divide into several corps, so as to be speedily at
hand on every point which might be threatened. These
sudden attacks were generally made and repulsed by means
of shooting arrows and throwing stones. They were rather
harassing than sanguinary.
After these resultless alarms had been kept up for
some time, a little band of four daring horsemen succeeded
in crossing the ditch, at a spot where it was narrow,
and thus broke the novel spell of the fortifications,
for a moment. But instead of immediately securing the
ground they had gained and seeking to facilitate the
crossing over of the army after them, they recklessly
advanced, and one of them, the aged Amr, who wished
to avenge a wound he had received at Bedr, loudly challenged
any of the Moslems to single combat. The Moslems were
not slow in occupying the weak point of the ditch; and
one of them, the heroic Ali, took up the challenge to
the duel. After a brief combat, Amr was killed, and
lay stretched upon the ground 'like the trunk of a tree.'
Then his three companions sought safety in a swift retreat,
but only two of them succeeded, and the third, unable
to clear the ditch, was cut down there by a pursuer.
In the night the dangerous part of the ditch was widened
and deepened, under the direction of Salman the Persian,
and for some days longer the hostile armies remained
face to face, and exchanged showers of arrows across
the ditch which kept them asunder. These arrows did
little harm, and we can form an idea of the very unbloody
character of the |
|
SEC. II. 7.] |
SIEGE
OF MEDINA. |
167 |
|
blustering Arab wars of those days, and especially
of the absence of martial qualities amongst the allied
forces of Meccan traders and greedy Bedouins, when we
are told that, during this close siege of several weeks,
the Moslems had only five men killed, and the entire
loss of the confederates amounted to three, inclusive
of the two heroes who dared to beard the Moslem lions
in their den behind the ditch.
Both sides evinced a greater partiality for cunning
and secret machinations, than for self-sacrificing heroism.
Mohammed was ready to buy off the powerful Beni Ghatafan
and to induce them to desert the Meccans, by the offer
of the third part of Medina's date harvest. He had already
made progress in his secret negotiations with their
chiefs, one of whom, Oyeina, was under obligation to
him for a former act of kindness, during a season of
drought; but the plan had to be relinquished, because
the leading men of Medina were reluctant to part with
their dates. Abu Sofyan, on his part, made underhand
efforts to induce the Beni Koreiza, the only Jewish
tribe still remaining in Medina, to play falsely to
Mohammed by raising the banner of revolt in the city
itself and openly embracing the cause of the besiegers.
But the Jews considered such a step fraught with too
great a peril; for Moslem soldiers were constantly patrolling
the streets, and the Jews were well enough acquainted
with Arab fidelity to apprehend that they might be deserted
and left to Moslem vengeance, in case the confederate
cause did not triumph. All these intrigues from both
sides did not lead to any practical result, and, as
spies were freely employed, only served to increase
distrust against the suspected parties and to lessen
the disposition to risk a decisive engagement.
When the siege had lasted for two or three weeks,
Medina was still intact behind its dike and effectually
guarded by its untiring defenders; but the hosts of
besieging Bedouins were sorely pressed by want of provisions
for the men and fodder for their numerous camels. The
hardships of the Meccan army were increasing, and no
gain accrued to compensate for them. At last a violent
tempest, with cold wind and pouring rain, swept over
the district, so that the tents were blown down, the
cooking-pots upset, and the fires extinguished. According
to Ibn Ishak, one of Mohammed's |
|