190 HIS FULL SUCCESS IN MEDINA. [BK. I. CH.II.

he furnishes us with a glimpse of what was the current of his own thoughts: politics and power seem to be the great motors, religion the indispensable, but still subordinate, adjunct. Mohammed, anxious to avoid a hostile encounter with the Koreishite force, took his way over rocks and through ravines where cavalry could not easily follow, to the plain of Hodeibia in the Nakhla valley, and there encamped, close to the border of the sacred territory.

From this position a sudden rush upon the city of Mecca might perhaps have been effected with success, and according to one account Mohammed actually made the proposal, and was only kept from attempting it by Abu Bekr's wise and moderating counsel. But, according to another account, he openly declared, 'There is no favour whereby the Koreish may this day request me to prove my love of kindred towards them, that I will not grant;' and he even ascribed the peaceful lying down of his weary camel to Divine agency, saying, 'He who once prevented the elephant from entering Mecca, has also now stopped my camel.'

The propinquity of Hodeibia to the city rendered negotiation by means of messengers easy. It was therefore speedily entered upon and actively carried on. Mohammed protested against the injustice of excluding him from the sanctuary, urging that he had no hostile intentions, but was actuated merely by motives of devotion. The Meccans, on their part, were afraid that, by letting him come in, they might assume the appearance of yielding to force and being swayed by a dread of his power. They said, 'Even if he does not come for war, yet shall he not force us to let him enter; the Arabs shall never taunt us with his having done so.' After much discussion and mutual protestation, a formal agreement was arrived at, by which the Meccans saved appearances and the Moslems secured substantial advantages. Such an issue is scarcely to be wondered at, if we bear in mind that, in consequence of Mohammed's rapid advance in wealth and power, he had already gained many secret sympathisers in Mecca, both amongst his relatives and others, so that Ibn Ishak could report, 'The Beni Khoza, as well believers as unbelievers, were Moham-

SEC. II. 10.] TREATY WITH THE KOREISH. 191

med's secret partisans and communicated to him whatever happened in Mecca.'

According to the stipulations of the treaty entered upon, there was to be a cessation of war for ten years, during which term neither party might commit any act of hostility, robbery, or theft, against the other. Both parties should be perfectly free to form alliances with whomsoever they pleased; but in the case of fugitives whose extradition is demanded, only the Moslems, not the Meccans, should be bound to surrender them. On the present occasion Mohammed and his followers should not be allowed to cross the sacred precincts, but in the following year, the Koreish were to vacate the city for three days, in favour of the Moslems, who might then enter, unarmed and with their swords sheathed, as mere pilgrims. Mohammed certainly acted with prudence in accepting these conditions and thus averting a sanguinary conflict under unfavourable circumstances, though, by doing so, he caused disappointment to his more bellicose followers, notably Omar, who expected to enter Mecca triumphantly, according to a dream which the Prophet had previously had to that effect. But even they were soon compensated for the present disappointment by the far easier conquest of the Jewish colonies in Khaibar and elsewhere, as we have already seen (p. 179-181).

The important advantages which Mohammed secured by his treaty with the Koreish are thus referred to by Ibn Ishak: 'No greater victory had as yet been obtained for Islam. Hitherto there had been war everywhere. But after this treaty of peace, when war had ceased and people met in security, then they entered into conversation, and every intelligent person with whom the merits of Islam were discussed, embraced it, so that, within the two following years, as many or more people joined it as had done so since it first began. This is proved by the fact that Mohammed went to Hodeibia with only 1400 followers, according to Jabir's account, whereas, two years later, he marched out for the conquest of Mecca with an army 10,000 strong.'