190 |
HIS
FULL SUCCESS IN MEDINA. |
[BK. I. CH.II. |
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he furnishes us with a glimpse of what was the current
of his own thoughts: politics and power seem to be the
great motors, religion the indispensable, but still
subordinate, adjunct. Mohammed, anxious to avoid a hostile
encounter with the Koreishite force, took his way over
rocks and through ravines where cavalry could not easily
follow, to the plain of Hodeibia in the Nakhla
valley, and there encamped, close to the border of the
sacred territory.
From this position a sudden rush upon the city of
Mecca might perhaps have been effected with success,
and according to one account Mohammed actually made
the proposal, and was only kept from attempting it by
Abu Bekr's wise and moderating counsel. But, according
to another account, he openly declared, 'There is no
favour whereby the Koreish may this day request me to
prove my love of kindred towards them, that I will not
grant;' and he even ascribed the peaceful lying down
of his weary camel to Divine agency, saying, 'He who
once prevented the elephant from entering Mecca, has
also now stopped my camel.'
The propinquity of Hodeibia to the city rendered negotiation
by means of messengers easy. It was therefore speedily
entered upon and actively carried on. Mohammed protested
against the injustice of excluding him from the sanctuary,
urging that he had no hostile intentions, but was actuated
merely by motives of devotion. The Meccans, on their
part, were afraid that, by letting him come in, they
might assume the appearance of yielding to force and
being swayed by a dread of his power. They said, 'Even
if he does not come for war, yet shall he not force
us to let him enter; the Arabs shall never taunt us
with his having done so.' After much discussion and
mutual protestation, a formal agreement was arrived
at, by which the Meccans saved appearances and the Moslems
secured substantial advantages. Such an issue is scarcely
to be wondered at, if we bear in mind that, in consequence
of Mohammed's rapid advance in wealth and power, he
had already gained many secret sympathisers in Mecca,
both amongst his relatives and others, so that Ibn Ishak
could report, 'The Beni Khoza, as well believers as
unbelievers, were Moham- |
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SEC. II. 10.] |
TREATY
WITH THE KOREISH. |
191 |
|
med's secret partisans and communicated to him whatever
happened in Mecca.'
According to the stipulations of the treaty entered
upon, there was to be a cessation of war for ten years,
during which term neither party might commit any act
of hostility, robbery, or theft, against the other.
Both parties should be perfectly free to form alliances
with whomsoever they pleased; but in the case of fugitives
whose extradition is demanded, only the Moslems, not
the Meccans, should be bound to surrender them. On the
present occasion Mohammed and his followers should not
be allowed to cross the sacred precincts, but in the
following year, the Koreish were to vacate the city
for three days, in favour of the Moslems, who might
then enter, unarmed and with their swords sheathed,
as mere pilgrims. Mohammed certainly acted with prudence
in accepting these conditions and thus averting a sanguinary
conflict under unfavourable circumstances, though, by
doing so, he caused disappointment to his more bellicose
followers, notably Omar, who expected to enter Mecca
triumphantly, according to a dream which the Prophet
had previously had to that effect. But even they were
soon compensated for the present disappointment by the
far easier conquest of the Jewish colonies in Khaibar
and elsewhere, as we have already seen (p. 179-181).
The important advantages which Mohammed secured by
his treaty with the Koreish are thus referred to by
Ibn Ishak: 'No greater victory had as yet been obtained
for Islam. Hitherto there had been war everywhere. But
after this treaty of peace, when war had ceased and
people met in security, then they entered into conversation,
and every intelligent person with whom the merits of
Islam were discussed, embraced it, so that, within the
two following years, as many or more people joined it
as had done so since it first began. This is proved
by the fact that Mohammed went to Hodeibia with only
1400 followers, according to Jabir's account, whereas,
two years later, he marched out for the conquest of
Mecca with an army 10,000 strong.' |
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