or those who had turned Moslems against their will, from the mere force of circumstances, were thoroughly averse to the hazardous expedition, and anxious to escape from its hardships and dangers. Some of them are said to have been assembling outside the city in the house of Suweilim, a Jew; and when Mohammed heard of it, he sent a number of trusty followers and had the house burned over their heads. The other 'dissemblers and doubters' in Medina made the requisite preparations for the war, but formed a distinct camp under their leader Abd Allah Ibn Obei; and Ibn Ishak observes that the number of the dissemblers was supposed to have been not inferior to that of the sincere Moslems. It must have been no small disappointment to Mohammed to find that, at the decisive moment, when he issued the order to march, a very considerable body of men, with their leader, made excuses and stopped behind, so that, to prevent them from doing mischief during his absence, he had to request Ali, that formidable champion, likewise to remain in Medina.

But even the main army, gathered from so many tribes, was not free from 'hypocrites'; and Ibn Ishak informs us that some, with the intent of disheartening others, expressed their apprehensions, during the march, in words such as these, 'Do you suppose that a war against the Romans is the same thing as a war against the Arabs? To us it seems as if we were already bound with ropes, like captives.' Mohammed had also urged on the believers the duty of contributing money and beasts of burden to 'the cause of God,' as he was pleased to call this war-expedition. Many of the rich responded liberally, and Othman alone is said to have contributed a thousand gold pieces; but others were behind-hand even in this, and the Prophet is reported to have said, concerning some of them, a section of the Aslamites, 'What hindered these people, if stopping behind themselves, from at least lending their camels to those who gladly march in the path of God?'

The army which Mohammed succeeded in collecting did not come up to the standard desired by him, as regards number and equipment. Ibn Ishak gives no particulars on these points; but later historians represent it as consisting

of 30,000 men, with 10,000 horses and 12,000 camels. If this is not an exaggeration, the force was still such as to cause surprise that Mohammed attempted no more with it than he actually did. He had summoned the people to a war against the Romans; but he arrested his northward march at Tabuk, little more than half the distance to Muta, where, the year before, Zeid had first met the Roman troops, and where he, no doubt, would also have found them, had he still had the courage to engage them in battle. But he had evidently given up his original intention and come to the conclusion that his safer and more prudent course was, to avoid a hostile encounter with the Romans. The multitude of his converts, about the hollowness of whose conversion he ought never to have entertained any illusion, sadly disappointed his expectation: the army was far less numerous than he had hoped it would be, and yet abounded in doubtful elements. Besides, he could not conceal from himself that the 'hypocrites' staying at home, constituted a most serious danger, especially if he were to meet with a reverse similar to Zeid's. Mohammed was always more distinguished for prudent calculation than for manly courage. He evidently shrank from attempting, with his not inconsiderable army, what a year ago he had expected Zeid to accomplish with a much smaller force.

At Tabuk he mounted an eminence, and, turning to the north, said, 'This is Syria;' then, turning to the south, said, 'This is Yemen,' as if content to leave the confines between Rome and Arabia undisturbed, for the moment. Ibn Ishak sums up the whole exploit in these few words, 'Mohammed remained about ten nights in Tabuk, and did not go beyond it. Then he returned to Medina.' His plan of invading and conquering Syria was postponed, under existing circumstances, but by no means relinquished. A year later, another army was equipped for the same purpose; and then Mohammed found it practicable to devolve the responsibilities and risks of commandership upon younger shoulders. The present much trumpeted expedition against the Romans dwindled down to a mere armed demonstration, to impress the border tribes with the stirring activity and