thereof; and We will surely reward the thankful' [Suratu Ali 'Imran (iii) 139]. In this connexion we may again quote the passage from Suratu'sh-Shams (xci) 7-10, already quoted (p. 13), 'By the soul and Him who completely formed it, and inspired into the same its (faculty of distinguishing, and power of choosing) wickedness and piety: now is he who hath purified the same happy; but he who hath corrupted the same is miserable.' It is this knowledge of the distinction between good and evil, and the power to choose the one or the other, to which reference is here made; and the ultimate destiny of the individual is said to be dependent on the choice which he makes.

What the Qur'an has to say on the justice with which man is, and will always be treated by God, also bears on this point. The refrain, 'nor shall he be unjustly treated', is a common one, and undoubtedly it meant on the lips of Muhammad just exactly what the words literally mean, whatever the theologians may say to the contrary. Man will be rewarded or punished according as he has lived on earth, for he is responsible. God's direction and guidance have been offered to him, and he will be judged by God according as he has accepted and followed it, or rejected it and despised it.

How far this choice extends, or rather, how far it is free, is a hard question to decide. The Qur'an does not help us much to develop this doctrine, and hence it is that Muhammadan theologians have developed it on the one side and on the other, from a speculative or philosophical, rather than from a theological or practically religious point of view; for the question of free

will or want of free-will is one on which the human soul seeks light — it matters not whence the light comes.

The Qur'an, we have said, does not help us much to develop this doctrine; yet it undoubtedly teaches that man has some capacity or power which it describes as will or choice. He can will to do this or that, and in accordance as he wills good or evil, so is he praiseworthy or blameworthy. And it is quite beside the question to speak of the will as not being free, because it has choice only within those limits which are imposed upon it by the constitution of man's nature.

As regards religion the point at issue is a practical one, and the question must be looked at from a practical point of view. Man may be a free agent within the limits of his own sphere, so to speak; and that he has not power of will or choice in the sense and on the plane on which God Himself is a free agent, is no ground for maintaining that he is the plaything of destiny.

The Qur'an teaches that the whole world, and man, naturally, as a part of that world, is under the beneficient rule of an all-wise and all-powerful God; but the doctrine of the absolute decrees of God, as developed by the schools of orthodox Muhammadanism, is a very one-sided exposition of the Qur'an and is quite contrary to its general teaching. The Qur'an gives due emphasis to both God's decrees and man's freedom of will, and any doctrine developed on this point, truly based on the teaching of the Qur'an, must recognize both and endeavour to find for each its proper place and value. It must not accept the one and explain away the other, however difficult it may be, or even impossible, to formulate such a doctrine to the satisfaction of the human mind.